§ 1. Introduction

Milton Friedman's Presidential Address to the American Economic Association, delivered on 27
December, 1967 (Friedman, 1968) , is one of the enduring classics of Macroeconomics of the second half of the twentieth century. It ranks with Paul Samuelson's overlapping generations classic, Robert Lucas' pioneering contribution to the genesis of Newclassical economics (Lucas, 1972) , Robert Clower's brilliant indictment of the Neoclassical Synthesis (Clower, 1965) and Richard Goodwin's supremely elegant, characteristically concise, invoking of the Lotka-Volterra dynamic mechanisms to model the symbiotic nature of capitalist interaction (Goodwin, 1967) as one of five perennial documents of the dynamic development of macroeconomic theory and policy in that half-century.
Paradoxically, for the first fifty years of the twentieth century, it would more be in terms of the classic books that defined the subject that came to be called Macroeconomics after WW II. In this case, I have always chosen Wicksell (1906) , Robertson (1926) , Keynes (1936 ), Myrdal (1939 and Lindahl (1939) . 1 Many scholars would identify the core arguments in the classic by Friedman as an indictment, refinement and a generalization of the Phillips Curve, as conventionally interpreted and used in macroeconomic policy contexts; others may see and read it as a precursor to the rational expectations revolution, via the suggestion for an expectation augmented Phillips Curve.
Few would deny that its lasting impact on the subject came about via the introduction of the notion of a Natural Rate of Unemployment (ibid, p. 8). Friedman's classic -as well as the other nine I have chosen -seems to have suffered the fate of pioneering contributions to a subject: often quoted, seldom read. This is, perhaps, one reason -but there are many -why one re-4 discovers unpolished gems in them, buried in the subtle caveats and the explicitly unstated assumptions.
In this paper I concentrate on the Natural Rate of Unemployment, its claimed analogy with Wicksell's celebrated Natural Rate of Interest, its asserted analytic determination and, to some extent, the associated economic interpretation. From the dual standpoint of a Wicksellian and a Keynesian, on the one hand, and from the point of view of computable or constructive mathematics, on the other, I am not convinced that the many claims in Friedman's classic can be substantiated. I believe some of my skepticism can be demonstrated with the kind of rigour that goes along with any mathematical characterization of an analytical claim. However, the doctrinehistorical doubts I cast may appear as a form of aspersion from someone who is opposed to the ideological underpinnings of the policy nihilism implied in Friedman's powerful assertions.
In any case, the paper is structured as follows. In the next section I attempt to anchor the notion of the Natural Rate of Unemployment in the way macroeconomics evolved in decade on either side of 1967 -the Phillips (1958) classic, at one end, and the emergence of the Lucasian revolution from 1972 onwards. In section 3, I claim that the mathematical justification of "My association with that concept goes back to my 1967 essay on optimal inflation 2 control [Phelps, 1967] , which gave the idea an algebraic formulation. There I dubbed the concept the `warranted' rate of unemployment because, in the model there, it is that 5 unemployment level which is called for if the public's expectations of the rate of inflation are to be met. Since a characteristic of Roy Harrod's `warranted rate of growth' was that it might be manipulated if otherwise it would cause harm, I thought I had hit upon a valuefree term. But Milton Friedman's catchy term for the same idea, though derived from a different model, was the easy winner. Not that I (nor Friedman) was the first to conceive or utilize the idea: Hayek, Mises, Fellner, and Wallich all talked about and wrote about it in earlier decades, and the latter two taught it to me. It runs in the blood of economists between the Danube and the Rhine.
3 " Phelps, 1979, p.93 ; second set of italics added.
This curiosum, coupled to the equally little known fact, at least in the standard literature, that Grunberg and Modigliani (1954) with all that such a notion implies for a Keynesian interpretation of the Macrostatics -is warranted by the expectations of profitability on the basis of which optimizing behavior on 3 The penultimate phrase and the last sentence are, surely, entirely gratuitous. Whether Hayek or Mises (in the inclusive sense), were economists whose 'blood' was genetically endowed with the notion of the natural rate of unemployment -or in its incarnation as a warranted rate in the sense of Harrod -because it emerged from them being 'between the Danube and the Rhine' is a debatable question. In the case of the former, it would depend on the side of the city of Vienna that was his home; in the case of the latter, it is even more tenuous, given that Mises was born in (today's) Ukraine! As for Fellner and Wallich, the assertion is simply false -Fellner was born in Budapest and studied at Berlin and Zurich, before emigrating to the US; Wallich was born and educated in Berlin and arrived in the US by a circuitous route that did not involve any sojourn 'between the Danube and the Rhine.' Of course, there may have been many economists in whose 'blood', formed 'between the Danube and the Rhine', ran the notion of the 'warranted rate' or the 'natural rate' or whatever 'rate'; but for every such economist, it is not unlikely that an equally -or more distinguished -scholar in whose 'blood', formed 'between the Danube and the Rhine', no such notion was intrinsic. 4 As Grunberg & Modigliani (ibid, p. 469; italics added), remarked: "There exists, then, at least one correct public prediction, provided that the supply and demand curves intersect once in the positive quadrant. Note that in our example public prediction prevents possible error of expectation on the part of suppliers. As suppliers fully accept the public prediction -which turns out to be correct -they act on the basis of warranted expectation." This paper used the Brouwer fixed-point theorem, inspired by Herbert Simon (ibid, footnote 1, p. 465), slightly prior to, and independent of, its use by Arrow and Debreu (1954) . 6 investments and choice of techniques will imply a particular level of employment and, via the effect on factor shares, effective demand such as to lead to dynamics in the product market. This, in turn, will feedback on the dynamics of the labour market and, by means of a warranted rate of expectations of profitability, lead to a next round of impact on investment and choice of techniques as a result of productivity changes and the cycle continues, either towards a stable disequilibrium dynamics in the form of a point attractor or a fluctuating profile in any one of many possible basins of attraction of limit configurations: limit cycles, strange attractors, etc.
The key unorthodox adjustment dynamics in this scenario is provided by freeing factor shares to vary over the cycle. Any use of a conventional production function locks the exponents in such a way that factor shares are prevented from acting as adjustment variables in mediating between the imbalances in aggregate supply and demand in the labour and product markets. However, by using the more general and more flexible technical progress function it is possible to endow the distributive variables with a more active role in the overall disequilibrium dynamics of a model of fluctuations in product and labour markets. 
But what if the analysis is seriously fallacious -from claimed formal assertions and the theory is
fundamentally a disguised form of the Marxian theory of the 'reserve army of labour' and the ideas that determine action echo that famous Keynesian dictum (Keynes, 1936, pp. 383-4 ; italics added):
he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil."
8
The main point of this section is to show, rigorously, that the analysis -and the associated claims for policy -in the Friedman classic is not only fallacious but algorithmically vacuous. This latter issue makes the framework inapplicable in any policy context.
I consider the two propositions embedded in the following two celebrated, oft quoted (seldom, in my opinion, investigated in any rigorous way whatsoever), assertions by Friedman to be fallacious and cannot be substantiated by any formalization (Friedman, 1968, p. 8 & footnote 3, p. 8, respectively; italics added):
i. "The 'natural rate of unemployment,' …, is the level that would be ground out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations 7 , provided there is imbedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets, including market imperfections, stochastic variability in demands and supplies, the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities, the costs of mobility, and so on." ii. It is perhaps worth noting that this 'natural' rate need not correspond to equality between the number unemployed and the number of job vacancies. For any given structure of the labor market, there will be some equilibrium relation between these two magnitudes, but there is no reason why it should be one of equality."
It is clearly evident that the italicised assertion in (ii) is a formal existence theorem -or, at least, a 'proposition' -while (1) is an unambigouos claim that the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations can grind out a solution -whether with or without the additional features
Friedman considers desirable ('the actual characteristics of the labour and commodity markets' -whatever 'actual' means, in this or any other case -'ditto' for all of the other 'caveats').
Now, what does 'ground out' mean -formally or informally? Let us assume that it means
'solvable' 8 , in the usual, 'common sense', notion of the term, whether by 'brute force' or more refined methods (which will, of course, depend on the nature and number of these 'equations'). Is the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, in fact, solvable? It is easy to show, as rigourously as one wishes -in any sense of rigour one wishes to use 9 -that it is not, provided 7 Friedman does not refer to a 'system of inequalities'. 8 The notions of solvability and unsolvability require formal definitions to make sense in this -or any other -serious context. To the best of this author's knowledge, the most detailed consideration of the notion of solvability, especially in an economic decision-making context, is that by Newell & Simon (op.cit). 9 As G.H. Hardy wryly noted (Hardy, 1929, p. 18 ; italics in the original):
9 we understand the difference between proving the existence of a solution and finding a method to demonstrate the solution. This is no where better clarified than in the prescient observation by Arrow, et. al., (1958, p. 17 ; italics added):
"[W]e want to stress that solutions which are not effectively computable 10 are not properly solutions at all. Existence theorems and equations which must be satisfied by optimal solutions are useful tools toward arriving at effective solutions, but the two must not be confused."
11
In this precise sense of solvability, I have shown in a series of articles 12 that no formalisation of the Walrasian system of equilibrium equations is either constructively or computable solvable; a fortiori, then, this conclusion holds true of Friedman's entirely justifiable augmented system of such equations -or inequalities -incorporating realistic (sic!) market imperfections, stochastic variability 'and so on'.
As for the claim in (ii), i.e., 'for any given structure of the labor market, there will be some equilibrium relation between the number unemployed and the number of job vacancies,'
interpreted as a pure existence theorem is easily demonstrated in a classical 13 model of a growth cycle, as in Goodwin (1967) . However, quite apart from the well-known mathematical
here is, strictly, no such thing as mathematical proof;; that we can, in the last analysis, do nothing but point;; that proofs are what … I call gas, rhetorical flourishes designed to affect psychology, pictures on the board in the lecture, devises to stimulate the imagination of pupils. This is plainly not the whole truth, but there is a good deal in it." I am, unfortunately, not able to interpet the above two assertions by Friedman as anything other than 'devices to stimulate the imagination'. There is not the slightest hope, without going back to the proverbial 'drawing board' of Walrasian general equilibrium theory, to redo it 'nearer one's heart's desire' (pace Khayyaam). One may have expected a Marshallian like Friedman to appeal to this Cambridge neoclassical maestro, than to his almost contemporary Lausannian, Walrasespecially in this aspect.infelicities of this model, it is also squarely within the tradition of assuming a variant of Say's even on its own, these notions and claims are quantitatively meaningless. In particular, there is no justification whatsoever to ground any kind of implementable monetary policy with these notions underpinning the model that is used for this purpose -with or without rational expectations, with or without incorporating more 'realistic' structural characteristics of the labour market, and so on.
The Lucasian revolution has, however, all but decimated the visions and prescriptions, for good and evil, propagated by Keynes and Friedman. The benchmark model of the macroeconomy has no role for money, let alone monetary policy.
All that 'constrained discretion' is supposed to achieve, even when coherent and applicable, is a rational path towards the real dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE), prescribed by the currently dominant theory of macrodynamics, whether of the Newclassical or of the New Keynesian variety. (1939) , as is confirmed by the remarkable revised-review by Hicks (1934 Hicks ( , 1982 17 .
What I find even more distressing is that even Friedman's addition (op. cit, p. 8) , 'of only one wrinkle to Wicksell -the Irving Fisher distinction between the nominal and the real interest rate of interest', 18 would not have been necessary had the great monetarist studied the Swedish literature -even if only those available in the English language -more diligently.
All the same, I would personally have much preferred to have Milton Friedman's outspoken and always innovative visions and pungent opinions-whilst holding his monetary, quantity theoretic,
